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International Toleration: Rawlsian
versus Cosmopolitan
KOK-CHOR TAN*
Abstract
How should liberal societies respond to nonliberal ones? In this paper I examine John Rawls’s
conception of international toleration against what is sometimes called a cosmopolitan one.
Rawls holds that a just international order should recognize certain nonliberal societies, to
whichherefersasdecentpeoples, asequalmembers ingoodstanding ina just societyofpeoples.
It would be a violation of liberalism’s own principle of toleration to deny the international
legitimacyofdecentpeopleswho,amongother things, affirmhumanrightsandacceptpeaceful
coexistencewithothersocieties.Accordingtothecosmopolitanideaof international toleration,
on the contrary, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. I
suggest that, against the Rawlsian conception of international toleration, the cosmopolitan
idea is more consistent with the fundamentals of liberal political morality. I then clarify the
ways in which cosmopolitan toleration is not worryingly interventionist even as it is not
altogether toothless; and I end with some reflections on why cosmopolitism is not morally
imperialistic.
Keywords
cosmopolitism; international justice; intervention; Law of Peoples; liberalism;moral imperial-
ism; Rawls; toleration
What is the limit and scope of international toleration? Given the fact of global
pluralism, which in itself need not be regrettable and is likely to be a permanent
featureofourworld,anaccountof international justicehastoprovidesomeguidance
for identifying the limits of permissible pluralism. That is, it has to offer a principle
of toleration that can define the type of global diversity that a just world order can
permit and identify the forms of political life that are objectionable and would not
be accommodated in an ideally just world. The question of toleration is especially
challenging if the international theoryof justice thatweareconstructing isproposed
as a liberal international theory. This is because while the principle of toleration is
one of the fundamental ideals of liberal political morality, liberalism is also defined
by its commitment to individual liberty and freedom, and these two ideals can
sometimes pull in different directions, as when the toleration of a collective way of
life is at oddswith the protection andpromotion of individual liberty. An acceptable
liberal theory of international justicemust, therefore, balance these two potentially
conflicting commitments in a coherent and plausible way.
* Assistant Professorof Philosophy,Universityof Pennsylvania. I thankmycommentatorThomasMertens and
participants at the Symposiumon ‘Cosmopolitism, Global Justice and International Law’, LeidenUniversity,
The Hague, 28 March 2005, for their critical questions and suggestions, and particularly Roland Pierik and
WouterWerner for helpful substantive and editorial comments on the draft.
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The problem of toleration is one of the central concerns in John Rawls’s The
Law of Peoples. As Rawls puts it, ‘decent nonliberal points of view exist, and . . . the
question of how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated is an essential question
of liberal foreign policy’.1 Thus a ‘main task in extending the Law of Peoples to
nonliberal peoples is to specify how far liberal peoples are to tolerate nonliberal
peoples’.2 Rawls holds that liberal peoples ought to tolerate nonliberal but decent
peoples. This means that liberal peoples should not, through their foreign policy,
attack or put pressure on decent peoples to become liberal. Given the propensity
of states, including ostensibly liberal ones, to intervene in nonliberal states in the
nameofadvancingliberaldemocracyglobally,Rawls’scautiousaccountof toleration
has obvious appeal. Yet some cosmopolitan theorists, who hold that the limits of
liberal toleration ought to be defined by the liberal commitment to individual
liberty, find the toleration of decent peoples problematic, especiallywhen tolerating
decent peoples means that the international community is compelled to condone
restrictions on the liberty of individuals (in these decent societies).3
This paper is an examination of Rawls’s international toleration and the cosmo-
politan alternative to it. To provide some background, I first briefly highlight some
of the relevant features of Rawls’s international theory and his conception of inter-
national toleration. I then offer some arguments for the cosmopolitan alternative
to Rawls’s account. In particular, I shall argue that the cosmopolitan conception of
international toleration is more consistent with liberalism’s own commitments to
individual freedom and liberty. Finally, I address the concern that a cosmopolitan
conception of toleration will ease the path of liberal military intervention against
nonliberal but decent peoples, and I try to assuage the concern that cosmopolitism
amounts to a form of moral imperialism.
Mydiscussion is concernedmorewithpolitical philosophy thanwith legal philo-
sophy and international law. My aim is to clarify the norms of toleration that a just
world order inspired by fundamental liberal values should uphold. How funda-
mental moral political commitments explicitly connect with international law is
a point I will largely leave to one side. But I believe that, in so far as we hope that
international law does reflect our justice-based commitments, clarifying the limits
of toleration canhelp to identify forus the rangeof international legal arrangements
that canbedescribedas just. Principlesof justice aredirectedat thebackground insti-
tutions of society, and in so far as these background institutions include (though are
not limited to) the legal institutions of society, principles of justice do influence our
evaluationofour legal arrangements. In this respect, normativepoliticalphilosophy
1. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), 10.
2. Ibid., at 59.
3. See, for example, thewritingsof twoof thecontributors to this issue:T. Pogge, ‘Rawlson International Justice’,
(2001) 51 (203) Philosophical Quarterly 246; Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, (1994) 23 (3) Philosophy
and Public Affairs 195; and S. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (2005); idem, ‘Cosmopol-
itism and the Law of Peoples’, (2002) 10 (1) The Journal of Political Philosophy 95–123. Other critics include
D. Moellendorf, ‘Rawlsian Constructivism and Cosmopolitan Justice’, in idem, Cosmopolitan Justice (2002);
A. Kuper, ‘Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples’, (2000) 28
Political Theory, 640–74; C. Beitz, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples’, (2000) 110 Ethics 669; also my Toleration, Diversity
and Global Justice (2000).
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can identify the fundamental norms that our global legal institutions should
reflect.
1. RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES
The central arguments of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples are well known, so some brief
remarks should suffice. The key question for Rawls is how the content of a theory
of international justice ‘might be developed out of a liberal idea of justice similar
to, but more general than, the idea [of] justice as fairness’.4 This ‘globalizing’ project
(as we may call it) proceeds in three main stages. The first stage extends ‘the so-
cial contract idea to the society of liberal peoples’.5 Here representatives of liberal
peoples, operating behind a veil of ignorance, so that they donot knowamong other
things thewealth and the extent of the territory and the size of the population of the
society that they represent,6 are to agree on principles regulating relations between
liberal peoples.7 Rawls suggests that representatives of liberal peoples in the global
original position will agree to the following (familiar) principles: (i) peoples are
free and independent; (ii) peoples are to observe treaties; (iii) peoples are equal and
are parties to the agreements binding on them; (iv) peoples have a duty of non-
intervention; (v) peoples have the right of self-defence, but not the right towagewar
other than for self-defence; (vi) peoples are to honour human rights; (vii) peoples
are to observe justice in war; and (viii) peoples have a duty to assist peoples lacking
the resources to sustain just regimes.8
The second stage of Rawls’s theory construction extends the reasoning to include
nonliberalbutdecentpeoples.HereRawlsaimstoshowhowandwhyrepresentatives
of certain kinds of nonliberal but well-ordered peoples would also endorse the
same set of principles. These are nonliberal peoples in that they do not endorse
the standard range of liberal democratic rights, such as freedom of expression and
association, religious equality, the right to equal political participation, and so on.
That is, individual members of these nonliberal societies are ‘not regarded as free
and equal citizens, nor as separate individuals deserving equal representation’.9 Yet
these peoples honour the basic human rights of their members (e.g. the right to life
4. Rawls, supra note 1, at 3. I discuss the relation between peoples and states more in ‘The Problem of Decent
Peoples’, in R. Martin and D. Reidy (eds.), Reading Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (forthcoming).
For the purpose of this paper, I will use ‘peoples’ or ‘societies’ (interchangeably as Rawls does) instead of
‘states’.
5. Rawls, supra note 1, at 4–5.
6. Ibid., at 32–3.
7. The original position, as we may recall, is ‘a device of representation’ where representatives of rational and
reasonable individuals deliberate according to the appropriate principles of justice for the basic structure of
their society. To ensure that this hypothetical deliberation is fair and equal, parties to the original position go
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. That is, they are asked to imagine that they do not know their actual status and
stations in society, their talents and conceptions of the good, and other particular facts about themselves.
In this way, no party to the deliberation can insist on terms biased towards her own interests according to
her own social, historical contingency and conception of the good. See, e.g., Rawls,A Theory of Justice (1971),
17 et seq. An important difference in the global original position is that the parties to the deliberation are
representatives of peoples rather than of individuals. The significance of this anti-individualist shift will be
clearer in due course.
8. Rawls, supra note 1, at 37.
9. Ibid., at 71; see also 71–5.
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and security, and to subsistence) and are respectful of other peoples10 as required
by the Law of Peoples. Accordingly, these nonliberal peoples are able to affirm and
conform to the principles of the Law of Peoples as identified above. Because they
accept the principles of the Law of Peoples, these ‘decent peoples’, as Rawls calls
them, qualify as ‘societies in good standing’, and are, therefore, to be tolerated by
liberal societies. This means that liberal societies are ‘to recognize these nonliberal
societies as equal participatingmembers in good standing of the Society of Peoples’,
and not just ‘refrain from exercising political sanctions – military, economic, or
diplomatic – to make a people change its ways’.11 Nonliberal peoples are tolerated
as a matter of liberal principle. They are societies in ‘good standing’ and are not
accommodatedmerely because of the moral and practical costs of intervention.12
This two-stage process of extending the Lawof Peoples to decent peoples – byfirst
identifyingtheprinciples that liberalpeopleswouldacceptandonlythenexamining
if decent peoples could also accept these principles –must be emphasized. The Law
of Peopleswants to achieve a global stabilitywith respect to justice, andnot stability,
as amodus vivendi, that is, stability as a balance of forces.13 The two-stage procedure
is thus crucial because it attempts to show that the global principles proposed by
liberal peoples are also principles that can be independently adopted by decent
nonliberal peoples, that it is not the case that liberal peoples have tailored their
global principles specifically with a view to accommodating nonliberal peoples or
existing global institutional arrangements. Whether Rawls succeeds in achieving
his stated goal is a questionwe shall take up below. But the thrust of the argument is
thatbecausedecentpeoples, even thoughtheyarenonliberal, canaffirmthesameset
of principles that liberal peoples independently accept, there is simplynoprincipled
reason to condemn or criticize decent peoples. As such, to recognize liberal peoples
as members in good standing of the Society of Peoples and not to grant similar
membership to decent peoples would be a clear case of double standards.
The third stage of Rawls’s construction concerns non-ideal theory: how are lib-
eral and decent peoples to deal with outlaw societies that do not conform to the
agreed Law of Peoples and with societies that because of unfavourable economic
and social conditions are unable to support well-ordered institutions and become
compliant members of the Society of Peoples?14 For our purpose, what is relevant
is that the Law of Peoples does not tolerate outlaw societies. Outlaw societies do
not honour the constraints of just war and/or are in systemic violation of the hu-
man rights of their own citizens. So outlaw societies do not meet the standards of
toleration because either they pose a threat to other peoples or they violate the
minimumstandard of decency by violating basic human rights, or both. Simply put,
10. Ibid., at 64–7.
11. Ibid., at 59.
12. From here on, the term ‘nonliberal peoples’ will also refer to decent peoples, unless the context clearly
determines otherwise. Rawls’s categories of peoples are ideal types, and so no real country will qualify as a
decent society. But as illustration, the constitutions of countries such as Tunisia, Jordan, Singapore,Malaysia,
Kuwait, and possibly Saudi Arabia are close examples of a Rawlsian decent nonliberal society.
13. Rawls, supra note 1, at 12–13, 44–5.
14. Ibid., at 89–90.
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outlaw societies do not accept principles for conduct that all reasonable peoples
accept.15
Somemay find it objectionable that liberal peoples are able to label a state ‘as an
outlaw state’. Does this not rest on the dangerous assumption that liberal peoples
enjoy a certain privilegedmoral viewpoint? Martti Koskenniemi, for example, wor-
ries that in Rawls’s theory, the ‘different-thinking Other becomes not just my ad-
versary, but an enemy of humanity because he fails to accept what I know is true of
all humanity’.16 But in his defence, Rawls begins his project from the understanding
that the principles of international justice cannot simply be based on what liberals
hold to be ‘true of all humanity’. Rawls’s motivating goal in The Law of Peoples is to
show that his conception of a just Society of Peoples as developed fromwithin polit-
ical liberalism is not ethnocentric. The principles of the Lawof Peoples are not based
narrowly on what liberals believe to be true, but are principles that can be affirmed
by different reasonable peoples for different reasons. For Rawls, outlaw societies are
renounced not because they deny the same moral worldview that liberals hold (as
Koskenniemi’s objection seems to imply), but because they refuse to acknowledge
principles that all reasonable peoples accept.17 The necessary conditions for being a
member in good standing of the Society of Peoples – respect for peaceful coexistence
and respect for basic human rights – do not derive from any unique (e.g. liberal)
standpoint but stem from a shared understanding and experience of our collective
existence as diverse peoples. Concerning human rights, Rawls writes that the idea
of human rights reflects the profound changes in global morality since the Second
WorldWar and is now very much part of humanity’s commonmoral vocabulary.18
This seems right – no states today openly reject universal human rights. To be sure,
some states continue to violate human rights. But the fact that human rights offend-
ers are also compelled todeny that they are violatinghuman rightswhenchallenged
is evidence that they accept that human rights are an inherent part of the normative
landscape whose violations per se cannot reasonably be justified.
Along the lines of the concern voiced above, itmight bepointed out that allowing
liberal peoples to categorize states according to their moral standing is akin to the
questionable practice during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when
European (Western) statesused their own ‘standardof civilization’ todeterminewho
was eligible formembership of the international legal community. But this concern
canbe deflected because the two cases are radically different. The issue is not the cat-
egorizationof statesper se, but the reasons for their categorizationand theprinciples
on which the categories are based. As mentioned above, the categorization of some
societies as ‘outlaw’ in Rawls’s account is based on reasons that nonliberal peoples
also accept. If the Law of Peoples can be described to be using a ‘standard of civili-
zation’, what is significant is that its standard is not an ethnocentrically liberal one.
Moreover, while in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ ‘civilizing’ project was
15. Ibid., at 80–1.
16. Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2001), 493.
17. Rawls, supra note 1, at 80–1.
18. Ibid., at 79.
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carried out, in the eyes of some, in the name of liberalism, it was not necessarily
consistent with the principles of liberalism. I will return to this point later in the
paper.19
The discussion of outlaw societies is useful inhelping to clarify the philosophical
basis of Rawls’s toleration of decent peoples. Outlaw societies do not comply with
the principles of the Law of Peoples, and so clearly do not meet the standards for
liberal toleration; indeed they may be attacked when the self-defence of liberal and
decent peoples warrants it, and they can also be intervened against when their
abuse of their own citizens’ human rights is serious enough and an intervention is
morally and politically appropriate (that is, meets the standard ‘just war’ criteria).
So the Law of Peoples clearly does not tolerate regimes that fail to comply with the
principlesagreedtobytheSocietyofPeoples,andingraveandurgentcasescanjustify
military action against them.20 Decent peoples, however, belong to a differentmoral
category – they are not to be attacked because they are peace-loving and respect the
human rights of their own citizens and others. But it is important to note that the
difference between decent peoples and outlaw societies is not fundamentally that
the lattermaybe intervenedagainstwhereas the formermaynot. Indeed, itwouldbe
a serious error to distinguish between outlaw anddecent societies purely in terms of
intervention. It is not the case that (for Rawls) all outlaw societies can be intervened
against or attacked. Only where the situation is urgent enough and military action
a reasonable and workable last resort is going to war an acceptable move.21 Decent
peoples are decent (and unlike outlaw societies) not simply because it would be
wrong to attack them, but primarily because they affirm the principles of the Lawof
Peoples and so there is no philosophical basis for criticizing them. To treat the limits
of interventionassynonymouswiththelimitsoftolerationthusmissesanimportant
difference between decent and outlaw societies within the moral framework of the
Law of Peoples – which is that there is no moral basis for criticizing decent peoples
while there are principled grounds for criticizing outlaw societies. The question
of intervention raises more specific issues in addition to that of toleration. As we
shall see later in the paper, this distinction between toleration and not intervening
is an important point, for it allows the possibility of a cosmopolitan alternative to
Rawlsian toleration that is not necessarily interventionist.
2. RAWLS’S INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION
Thus, for Rawls, tolerating another society entails more than just refraining from
forceful interventionagainst it. It includesthenotionsofacceptanceandrecognition,
orwhatwemay call ‘recognitional legitimacy’, adoptingAllen Buchanan’s phrase.22
When liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples, they not only refrain from acting
coercively against them (by not engaging in military intervention, for example);
19. This paragraph paraphrases an important question raised by the editors.
20. Rawls, supra note 1, at 37, 81, 93 n. 6.
21. Ibid., Part III.
22. A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (2004), ch. 6.
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theyare,more fundamentally, recognizing the legitimacyofdecentpeoplesandtheir
status as equals. Toleration thus expresses a certain normative attitude towards the
subject that is being tolerated, and is not just a prescription against military action
against the subject.
To put the above in a different way, Rawls’s account of international toler-
ation must not be understood primarily as a principle that defines the limits of
intervention but, more fundamentally, as a principle that defines the limits of per-
missible criticisms and judgments between peoples regarded as free and equal.
Of course, when we intervene to defend human rights, we are acting to enforce
our judgment that the rights violation is morally unacceptable. But judging that a
human rights violation is wrong is distinct from the act of enforcing that judgment,
and the principle of toleration is concerned foremost with the boundaries of judg-
ment rather than with enforcement. In other words, Rawls’s account of toleration
deals with the more fundamental question of appropriate judgment rather than
intervention – his principle of toleration sets limits on the kinds of judgment that
liberal peoplesmay reasonablymake, and not just the kinds of action that theymay
take to enforce their judgment.23
Thedistinctionbetweenmakinga judgment (criticizing) and enforcing that judgment
(intervening) allows us to understand better that even though outlaw societies fail
to meet the test for liberal toleration, it does not immediately imply that they may
be attacked or intervened against. As stated, the principle of toleration concerns the
more fundamental question of judgment –whether the legitimacy of a government
is to be recognized by a liberal people. But whether or not a liberal people may
act with force against a tyrannical or outlaw regime will depend on a variety of
further moral and pragmatic considerations, including the severity of the wrongs
of the regime, the potential repercussions (locally and globally) of forceful military
action, the probability of success of amilitary action, and so on.Wagingwar against
a tyrannical regime, even purely for the purpose of protecting basic rights, brings
into play additional considerations about the morality of going to war that the fact
of illegitimacy in itself does not address.
That toleration includes recognition and not merely non-intervention is an im-
portant point for Rawls’s project. It reflects and reinforces Rawls’s claim that decent
peoples are accepted into the Society of Peoples not for the sake of global stability
as a final end (or a modus vivendi). That is, decent peoples are tolerated on Rawls’s
account not as a second-best arrangement for the sake of minimizing conflict and
antagonism in spite of what justice demands. If this were so, the Law of Peoples
would be stable for the wrong reason. Rather, decent peoples are accepted into the
just Society of Peoples asmembers in good standing as amatter of liberal justice and
respect. For Rawls, their tolerance is a requirement of justice, not a compromise.
To be sure, Rawls’s account of international toleration allows space for private
(liberal) citizens to challenge decent peoples within the rules of the basic structure
of the Society of Peoples. Rawls’s toleration is thus not so implausibly restrictive as
23. The distinction between judgment and intervention is fromW. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal
Theory of Minority Rights (1995), 164–6.
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to prevent liberal individuals from speaking out against decent peoples and even
organizing nonviolently for their reform.24 If it were, Rawls’s theory would be a
perversion of liberalism – the right of individuals to criticize nonliberal ways of
life and to organize to protest against them non-violently follows from the liberal
freedoms of expression and association. Accordingly, onemight think that Rawlsian
international toleration is not as restrictive as some of Rawls’s critics have charged
because individual liberals can go on promoting liberal values globally through
private non-governmental channels. But this concession to Rawls’s critics does not
go far enough. Indeed, it misses the point of the dispute. The issue is what kinds of
background institution should be in place, not just what individuals should ormay
do within the rules of institutions. As a political ideal, the principle of toleration
is a principle for regulating institutions, and Rawls’s principle of international
toleration will shape in an important way the background rules and norms for
the basic structure of the Society of Peoples in favour of decent peoples. So while
there is surely space within the terms of Rawls’s international theory for liberal
persons to criticize decent peoples, the crucial question remains as to whether
this space is correctly drawn. If the aim of justice is to identify and establish the
appropriate background conditions of justice against which moral agents interact,
then cosmopolitans do have a case when they say that it is beside the point that
the Law of Peoples permits liberal citizens in their personal capacities to criticize
nonliberal peoples. Thequestionof global justice concernsnot justwhat individuals
and private associationsmay dowithin the rules of global institutions, but the kind
of global institutions that should be established and defended.
3. THE COSMOPOLITAN ALTERNATIVE
Rawls’s cosmopolitan critics reject his account of international toleration. Cosmo-
politanswill agreewithRawls that there aregoodmoral andpractical reasons fornot
engaging inmilitary intervention against decent peoples, and certainly they accept
that there are no reasons to attack them on grounds of self-defence because decent
peoples are not internationally aggressive. But cosmopolitans wonder whether lib-
eral peoples should not at least take a more critical stance towards these nonliberal
societies than Rawls’s account of toleration allows, and whether the rules of a just
Society of Peoples should recognize these societies as members in good standing
of a Society of Peoples. According to the cosmopolitan view, this withholding of
membership and recognition fromdecent peoples is required both as an affirmation
of the demands of justice and as an incentive for decent peoples to become liberal.25
What is it about the toleration of decent peoples that exercises Rawls’s cosmo-
politan critics? The problem of such toleration is not that it blocks liberals from
imposing liberal values on all persons. Cosmopolitans do not paternalistically de-
mand that all individuals regard themselves as free and equal. The problem of tol-
erating decent peoples is that it lets down dissenting individual members in these
24. Rawls, supra note 1, at 84.
25. See Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, supra note 3; and Pogge, ‘Rawls on International Justice’, supra note 3.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 28 May 2013 IP address: 130.91.151.136
INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION: RAWLSIAN VERSUS COSMOPOLITAN 693
nonliberal societies. According to the Law of Peoples, liberal peoples are not just
required to refrain from intervention in these cases; they are asked that they do not
even take sides in internaldisputes, for thiswouldbeatoddswith the ideal ofmutual
respect and recognition that liberal peoples are to show decent peoples. Defenders
of decent peoples seem to take international paternalism to be the central global
problem. Cosmopolitans, in contrast, are worried about individuals whose liberties
and liberal freedoms are denied by their own state. The fact of dissent in any society
(liberal or nonliberal) is a given, even under the construction of an ideal theory. It
is, after all, the inevitability of personal disagreements over conceptions of the good
that move political philosophers to care about the fairness of the background rules
of a society againstwhich suchdifferences are to be adjudicated. To assumeaway the
fact of dissent is to assumeaway the relevanceor ‘usefulness’ of the subject of justice.
Indeed Rawls recognizes the presence of individual dissent in decent societies, and
heexpectsadecent society topermitdissent.But theproblemis thatRawlsallows the
exercise of dissent to be limited by the hierarchical arrangement of the society in ac-
cordance with its common-good conception of justice. To take one example, we can
imagine a decent society in which women who wish to question their subordinate
politicalposition insocietymaydoso,butcansodoonly throughtheircorporate rep-
resentatives (such asmale heads of households or religious leaders or tribal leaders)
as determined by the non-egalitarian (but decent) social structure of that society.26
To say that the exercise of dissent is adequately provided for in this case, however,
seems paradoxical, for the structure of expressing dissent is constrained by the hier-
archical values of the society that are themselves the very source of contention.
The problem of decent peoples, then, presents the question of how to accommodate
andpermitmeaningful individual dissent in nonliberal societies. The cosmopolitan
criticisim is that Rawls’s account of toleration fails to offer a satisfactory response,
that it fails to offer sufficient protection to individuals in decent societies whose
aspirations to become free and equal persons are being thwarted by their state.
Inotherwords,whileRawls’s tolerationofdecentpeoples ismotivatedbythe ideal
of respect for the autonomy and independence of peoples as well as by a concern,
implicitly, for global peace and stability (that can be upset by liberal intervention-
ism), cosmopolitans aremoved by a distinct concern, that of supporting individuals
within decent societies whose liberal rights and freedoms are being denied. This is
not to say that cosmopolitans are indifferent to intervention, global stability, and
national self-determination. But, for cosmopolitans, there are other pressing global
moral values against which these concerns need to be balanced. Cosmopolitism is
thus not a form of moral imperialism or paternalism that has as its fundamental
intention the imposition of liberalism on all societies. Rather it is concerned fun-
damentally about protecting the rights of individuals, no matter where they are, to
choose a life for themselves.
To be sure, we can imagine a hierarchical decent society in which all persons
are content with their station and the duties accruing to it in the prevailing social
26. The situation of women in Saudi Arabia may be invoked as an example of this case. See also Rawls’s own
discussion of the fictional Kazanistan, supra note 1, at s. 9.3.
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order and there will be no visible dissent in this society. But one can reasonably
suspect that such a society is not really a decent one but a ‘successfully’ tyrannical
one that has effectively stymied or stunted any opposing views members of that
society would otherwise have, through, say, religious or political indoctrination.
Thus my account does not hold that cosmopolitans may not respond unless there
are dissenting individuals in decent societies. Cosmopolitans can reasonably be
sceptical of societies, liberal or otherwise, in which there is no open dissent at all,
and will therefore be moved to investigate why this is the case.
Why does Rawls reject the cosmopolitan position?27 Rawls’s central reason is
that a Law of Peoples founded on the cosmopolitan ideal of individuals as free
and equal would make the basis of that law ‘too narrow’.28 In other words, to
construct an international theory of justice premised on the cosmopolitan ideal that
all individuals qua citizens are free and equal is to propose a conception of justice
that nonliberal peoples, who hold different conceptions of political persons, could
reasonably object to. It would amount in effect ‘to saying that all persons are to
have the equal liberal rights of citizens in a constitutional democracy . . . that only
a liberal democratic society can be acceptable’.29 And this, Rawls says, ‘would fail to
express due toleration for other acceptable ways (if such as there are, as I assume) of
ordering society’.30 It is for this reason that Rawls rejects, as I noted earlier, a single
global original position procedure where individuals of the world are represented,
opting instead for a multi-stage procedure in which only representatives of peoples
are convened at the later stages of the original position.31 A single global original
position would have to assume that all individuals ‘have the equal liberal rights of
citizens in a constitutional democracy’,32 and this, in the name of liberal toleration,
we should not do.
This toleration of nonliberal ways of organizing society, Rawls argues, stems
from a principle that is central to political liberalism, that ‘a liberal society is to
respect its citizens’ comprehensive doctrines – religious, philosophical, andmoral –
provided that these doctrines are pursued in ways compatible with a reasonable
political conception of justice and its public reason’.33 Likewise, liberal societies
are to tolerate nonliberal societies as long as these are decent, that is, capable of
conforming to the principles of the Law of Peoples.
27. To be sure, Rawls’s commitment to human rights on the grounds that the interests of individuals are
fundamental suggests a sort of cosmopolitan commitment, Rawls’s own rejection of the cosmopolitan
position notwithstanding (supra note 1, at 82–3, also 119–20). But if we wish to read the Law of Peoples as
fundamentally a cosmopolitan one, a substantive difference between Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics
remains, in that his critics advanced a stronger cosmopolitan positionwhich holds that global justice ought
to regard each individual as a free and equal citizen in her own political community, whereas Rawls affirms
aweak cosmopolitan position that demands only that societies respect the basic rights of their own citizens.
The distinction between weak and strong cosmopolitism is from D. Miller, ‘The Limits of Cosmopolitan
Justice’, in D. Mapel and T. Nardin (eds.), International Society (1998).
28. The phrase in quotes is from Rawls’s essay ‘The Law of Peoples’, in S. Shute and S. Hurley (eds.), On Human
Rights (1993), 65.
29. Rawls, supra note 1, at 82–3.
30. Ibid., at 59.
31. Ibid., at 82–3, 30–5.
32. Ibid., at 82.
33. Ibid., at 59, 69–70.
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The idea of public reason, which is central to Rawls’s political liberalism, lim-
its the kinds of reason that individuals ‘may reasonably give one another when
fundamental political questions are at stake’.34 It holds that in such matters
individuals may not appeal to reasons based on their comprehensive moral, reli-
gious, or philosophical doctrines but only to reasons that they canpublicly justify to
eachotherwithin their sharedunderstandingof thepolitical conceptionof justice.35
This idea of public reason is extended to the international context in the following
way: ‘in proposing a principle to regulate the mutual relations between peoples, a
[liberal] people or their representatives must think not only that it is reasonable for
them to propose it, but also that it is reasonable for other peoples to accept it’.36
So while it would not be unreasonable, but is indeed ‘a consequence of liberalism
and decency’,37 to criticize, and even in grave cases intervene against, violations of
basic human rights in outlaw societies, it would be unreasonable to demand that
all societies adopt liberal democratic institutions. Similarly, while it is a reasonable
requirement of liberal (and indeed human) decency to assist others lacking basic
resources for a decent human life, it would be unreasonable to expect independent
peoples with distinct political and economic cultures to support ongoing distribu-
tion of resources for the sake of minimizing inequalities.38
Thus Rawls’s conception of international toleration is presented as an extension
of the idea of toleration as it is developedwithinpolitical liberalism for the domestic
society. But there are two important differences between Rawls’s conception of
toleration in the domestic context and his conception in the international context
that seem tome to impair the alleged analogy. First, the scope of toleration is unduly
extended as the idea of toleration is extended to the international domain. Second,
the background context and institutions against which the tolerance of nonliberal
groups takesplace is significantlydifferent in thedomestic and international arenas.
I will explain these two points in turn below.
3.1. Tolerating political diversity
Is it necessarily the case, as Rawls says, that ‘political liberalismwould fail to express
due toleration for other acceptable ways . . . of ordering society’39 if it insisted on
a cosmopolitan conception of toleration? Rawls, to recall, argues that liberalism
has to be accepting of well-ordered though nonliberal modes of ordering society.
This, he says, is analogous to the political liberal ideal of tolerating nonliberal
but reasonable philosophical, moral, or religious comprehensive views within a
democratic liberal society. But this supposed analogy between the domestic and
the international spheres does not seem to hold: while political liberalism tolerates
nonliberal philosophical, moral, and religious outlooks, it does not, and cannot,
34. Ibid., at 132.
35. Ibid., at 141.
36. Ibid., at 57.
37. Ibid., at 81.
38. For comments on public reason and the law of peoples, see D. Reidy, ‘Rawls on International Justice: A
Defense’, (2004) 32 Political Theory 291. For a comprehensive study of Rawls’s understanding of public reason
see S. Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justifications’, (2004) LXXII Fordham Law Review 2021.
39. Rawls, supra note 1, at 59.
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tolerate challenges to liberal political ideals themselves. As Rawls himself points
out in his discussion of liberal domestic justice, ‘comprehensive doctrines that can-
not support . . . a democratic society are not reasonable’.40 That is to say, the scope
of liberal toleration does not and cannot extend to alternatives to liberal justice
itself. A political philosophy, for reasons of consistency, must take a stance against
competing political philosophies. Indeed, Rawls is explicit in Political Liberalism
that a liberal must take steps, even invoke comprehensive claims when neces-
sary, to defend liberalism against alternative political conceptions. For example,
he writes,
Nevertheless, in affirming a political conception of justice we may eventually have
to assert at least certain aspects of our own comprehensive religious or philosophical
doctrine (by no means necessarily fully comprehensive). This will happen whenever
someone insists, for example, that certain questions are so fundamental that to insure
their being rightly settled justifies civil strife. The religious salvation of those holding
a particular religion, or indeed the salvation of a whole people, may be said to depend
on it. At this point we may have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply its denial
and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped to avoid.41
If it is correct that the scope of liberal toleration does not extend to nonliberal
ways of ordering politics in the domestic context, reasons must be given as to why
the scope of toleration should extend to nonliberals when we move to the global
context. To be consistent with its own fundamental commitments, a liberal law of
peopleshas toglobalize the standard liberal commitments, even if this entails taking
a stance against decent peoples. While decent peoples may find the cosmopolitan
commitment an imposition, this is not an unreasonable imposition from the liberal
point of view. A Lawof Peoples that claims to be ‘an extension of a liberal conception
of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples’42 has to remain steadfast in
its commitment to liberalism, and this means supporting the cosmopolitan view
that individual freedom is what ultimately matters.
So the tolerance of reasonable comprehensive doctrines in Rawls’s account of
domestic political liberalism is not quite the same as tolerating nonliberal peoples.
In one case, it is the tolerance of nonliberal comprehensive nonpolitical views; in
the other it is the tolerance of nonliberal political views.
Accordingly, somecosmopolitanshavearguedthatevenifwedonotadoptasingle
global original position (inwhich individuals of theworld rather thanpeoples are to
be represented behind the veil of ignorance) but grant Rawls’s multi-stage original
position procedure (with liberal peoples represented in the first stage, and decent
peoples in the subsequent stage), liberal peoples would still come upwith a slightly
different set of principles thatwould rule out decent peoples as inadmissible. Liberal
peoples in the first stage of the reasoning would not be content with principle 6 on
human rights, which minimally holds that all peoples respect basic human rights
defined as the class of urgent rights pertaining to the security and subsistence of
40. Ibid., at 172–3, also 178–9. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1992), 152–3.
41. Rawls, supra note 40, at 152.
42. Rawls, supra note 1, at 9 (emphasis added).
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persons and without which social co-operation between persons is impossible.43
Rather, they would require, in addition, that all peoples respect standard liberal
rights, suchastherighttoequalrepresentation, therighttodemocraticparticipation,
equal individual right of dissent and of expression and association, and so on. After
all, if only liberal peoples are present in the first stage of the construction, and if
(naturally) liberal peoples respect and honour liberal rights in addition to basic
human rights, whywould they settle for a principle that protects only basic human
rights? Their liberal commitments wouldmotivate them to settle for a more robust
principle on rights. Thus even on Rawls’s own method of construction, decent
peoples would be ruled out as members in good standing for the same reason that
outlaw societies are ruled out – they cannot liveup to thedemands of the liberal Law
of Peoples. The above observation has beenmade by Thomas Pogge, whowrites that
it is ‘quite unclear why delegates of liberal societies would not want to incorporate
more than Rawls’s list [of universal rights], which specifically excludes freedom
of speech . . . , democratic political rights . . . , and equal liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought’.44
In anticipation of this objection, Rawls argues that liberal peoples, without as-
suming whether or not decent peoples are to be tolerated, could not demand such
a principle without prejudicing the case against decent peoples. He asks, rhetor-
ically, ‘how do we know, before trying to work out a reasonable Law of Peoples,
that nonliberal societies are always, other things being equal, the proper subject
of sanctions?’45 The point here seems to be that liberal peoples, with the general
knowledge that the world is not made up only of liberal societies but contains also
nonliberal societies, shouldworry that amore stringentprincipleon rightswouldbe
disrespectful of nonliberal decent peoples and so would be in contravention of the
liberal principle of toleration. So, being reasonable peoples, liberal peoples would
not demand anything stronger than Rawls’s principle 6.
But this response seems tobeg the question in favour of toleratingdecent peoples.
The point of the construction of an international theory of justice is to determine
the limits of liberal toleration, and the terms of toleration are to be defined by the
principles of justice arrived at independently of whether it violates any existing
practice of toleration. Unless there are reasons why liberals should not opt for the
revised (more robust) principle 6 that are not motivated by a prior wish to tolerate
decent peoples (for this would be question-begging), the Law of Peoples need not
regard decent peoples as beyond criticism. Liberal peoples cannot assume that a
principle requiring liberal rights would be intolerant until they first clarify what
justicedemands; and to clarifywhat justice in fact demands, they shouldnot take the
toleration of decent peoples to be a desideratum that their account of justice should
accommodate. This would make the idea of justice subject to existing beliefs about
toleration, when in fact the limits of toleration are to be determined by reference to
the demands of justice.
43. Ibid., at 37.
44. Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, supra note 3, at 215; see also Pogge, ‘Rawls on International Justice’,
supra note 3.
45. Rawls, supra note 1, at 60.
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For this reason Beitz wonders if the Law of Peoples has not given too much
weight to what he calls a ‘pre-theoretical’ understanding of toleration. According
to Beitz, the tolerance of decent peoples is taken in Rawls’s theory construction as
condition that anyplausible liberal theory of global justicehas to accommodate. Yet,
Beitz continues, if one of the goals of a theory of justice is to establish the criterion
of toleration, then the starting assumption that decent peoples must be tolerated
cannot serve as one of the fixed points fromwhich to begin our theory construction.
Rather, this is an assumption that must be tested against the account of justice that
we arrive at independently of this consideration.46
Samuel Freeman makes the challenging observation that because representa-
tives of liberal peoples are interested only in the justice of their own society when
deliberating behind the global veil of ignorance, they do not have themotivation to
require that all peoples be liberal. They will want all peoples to be at least decent
(hence the refusal to tolerate outlaw societies) because outlaw societies pose a threat
to the peace and security of all peoples. Freeman rightly points out that even when
an outlaw society is not aggressive but violates only the rights of its own citizens,
it still presents a grave potential threat to world peace, as a quick look at historical
events reveals. So liberal representatives will want a principle that basic human
rights be honoured by all for the sake of ensuring the justice of their own societies,
but this self-interest of liberal peoples in the justice of their own respective societies
does not require more.47
Freeman is right to remind critics that deliberators at the Rawlsian original po-
sition have a very narrow and specific role, that they are conceived as agents of
the interests of those whom they represent. But even if Freeman is right that the
self-interest of liberal peoples does not require a world of liberal peoples, this does
not derail the general cosmopolitan critique presented above. For cosmopolitans
still have a response in hand, which is to deny (that which was granted above) that
a proper construction of a liberal international theory of justicemust take peoples as
thebasicmoralunit, that it is representatives of peoples that are tobepresentbehind
theveil of ignorance. Rather, cosmopolitanswould insisthere, it is representatives of
individualswho ought to be present at a global original position. A liberal construc-
tion of justice could not proceed in any other way given liberalism’s fundamental
commitment to individual well-being. Accordingly, on this understanding of the
global original position, representatives of individuals, who are motivated by the
well-being of individuals whose interests they represent, will opt for a global order
in which basic liberal rights and freedoms of all persons are protected. It is part
of any person’s interests, surely, that they be free to form, pursue, and revise their
conceptions of the good, a right that only citizens of a liberal society enjoy. Because
representatives of individuals behind a veil of ignorance in the global original pos-
ition do not know what kind of country the persons they represent will belong to
when the veil of ignorance is lifted, they would want a global principle protecting
not just the human rights but also the liberal rights of all persons in the world.
46. Beitz, supra note 3, at 681.
47. S. Freeman, ‘The Law of Peoples and Distributive Justice’, (forthcoming 2005) Social Philosophy and Policy.
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3.2. The right of exit
So the scope of toleration shifts without clear justification from domestic to global
contexts inRawls’sproject: nonliberalpoliticaldemands, intolerable in thedomestic
context of political liberalism, become tolerable in the context of the Lawof Peoples.
But there is another problem with extending to the global context the idea of
toleration conceived for the domestic context. While nonliberal comprehensive
doctrines are tolerated within the confines of a liberal state, individual liberty to
pursue liberal conceptions of the good is nonetheless protected because of the
state-protected individual right of exit from domestic associations. That is, in the
domestic context, the right of exit (as ensured by the liberal right of free association
and the freedom to form, pursue, and revise one’s conception of the good)may help
to facilitate the reconciliation of the liberal tolerance of nonliberal comprehensive
doctrines with its concern for individual basic liberties. Should individuals find
their associative membership oppressive, they are free to leave the association and
join more liberal ones should they wish. Thus, within the domestic liberal state,
the right of exit supposedly ensures that the (generous) toleration of nonliberal
comprehensive views is not at the cost of protecting the freedom of individuals
to live a life of their own choosing. So it is tempting to think that as long as the
Law of Peoples protects the right of exit (from decent societies), which it does,48
the tolerance of decent societies is not detrimental to individual liberty. To put it
in a different way, the cost of tolerating decent peoples is acceptable if there is a
guaranteed right of exit for individual members of these nonliberal groups.
But this appeal to the right of exit from nonliberal societies does not successfully
temper the potentially illiberal cost of tolerating decent peoples. The right of exit
does not serve as an escape valve in the global context as it might in the domestic,
given the different background conditions in each case. As an aside, it is worth
pointing out that the claim that a right of exit from private associations sufficiently
protects individual liberty in the domestic context is itself contestable.49 But even
granting that nonliberal associationswithin domestic societies are tolerable as long
as the individual right of exit is respected, it is doubtful that a recognized right of
exit in the global case offers similar protection to individuals living in oppressive
countries. There are two reasons for this. First, it is not obvious that the right
of exit can effectively provide a real and meaningful individual choice when the
oppressive arrangement in question is a country rather than a private association
within a country. Leaving one’s country often involves much more than leaving
a private association – it often requires moving away from a familiar culture and
language to an unfamiliar one; it involves leaving behind family and friends as
well as a way of accessing and understanding the world. Rawls himself notes as
much.While he holds that exit fromprivate associations is a normal and reasonable
enough occurrence in domestic society, Rawls writes that exiting a political society
48. Rawls, supra note 1, at 74.
49. For more on the inadequacy of a right of exit for internal minorities, see L. Green, ‘Internal Minorities
and Their Rights’, in J. Baker (ed.), Group Rights (1994), 101–17. See also A. Gutmann, Identity in Democracy
(2003), 59–64.
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‘is a grave step: it involves leaving behind the society and culture in which we have
been raised, the society and culturewhose languageweuse in speech and thought to
express and understand ourselves, our aims, our goals, our values’.50 A right of exit
doesnotoffer individuals adequateprotection fromoppressive societies, because the
cost of exit is often unreasonable for persons to bear. Of course it is not impossible
formany people to bear this cost, and historically individuals have. But the question
is whether it is just to expect them to do so.
The second reasonwhy the right of exit does not properlymake up for tolerating
oppressive societal arrangements is that it seems to be an empty right in the absence
of a correspondingdutyon thepartofother societies toaccept themasmembers.The
right of exit as it applies to countries is essentially the right of emigration. But the
right to emigrate is a hollow right if there is no corresponding right to immigrate to
another country. The Law of Peoples affirms that decent and liberal societies permit
its members to leave; it would be a restriction of a basic human right if individuals
are prevented from exiting the society of their birth. Yet the Law of Peoples does
not affirm a corresponding duty on the part of all peoples to accept all hopeful
immigrants. Indeed, Rawls notes that is possibly ‘at least a qualified right to limit
immigration’. One of the reasons for this right, Rawls mentions, following Michael
Walzer, is ‘to protect a people’s political culture and its constitutional principles’.51
The right of exit without the mirror right of entry into another country makes
the exit right a right in name only, and not a real and meaningful right that can
provide individuals with real options so as to justify liberal toleration of their
oppressive societies. In the domestic context, exercising the right of exit from an
oppressive arrangement does not deprive a person of membership of a legal and
political institution that can continue to protect her rights and entitlements. She
hasa largermembership, as a citizen, that canneverbe taken fromherand that larger
society serves as her default community. There is no similar default community and
membership of the global context when we are speaking of the individual right of
emigration, and so, without the right also to join a new political society, the right of
exit is actually a rather empty right. It is a right that cannot be readily exercised, even
if individuals are prepared to assume its costs, without further globally sanctioned
provisions such as the right of immigration.
One might think that the duty of countries to accept refugees, as exemplified in
the spirit of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
shows that individuals who find their domestic conditions oppressive have a right
to seek refuge in a third country. But, internationally, refugees are thosepersonswho
can demonstrate that they have a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion’.52 Under this standard guideline, members of an ideal Rawlsian decent
society do not qualify for refugee status even though theymay object to their lack of
personal liberty. Indeed, to allowmembers of decent societies to claim refugee status
50. Rawls, supra note 40, at 222; also Kymlicka, supra note 23, at 86–7.
51. Rawls, supra note 1, at 39 n. 48.
52. United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1.
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is to imply their unjust treatment by their own states, a position that is inconsistent
with Rawls’s conception of decent peoples as peoples who satisfy the requirements
of global justice. According to Rawls’s theory, only citizens of outlaw societies can
justly claim to be persecuted.
In sum the right of exit in the global context does not offer an adequate safeguard
for tolerating oppressive groups (even if we grant that it does in the domestic
context) because of the additional and unique costs of leaving one’s country and the
emptiness of that right absent a meaningful right of immigration.
For the above reasons, cosmopolitans would argue that Rawls’s account of toler-
ation has erred too much on the side of decent people and fails to protect seriously
the basic liberties of citizens within these societies. This does not mean that decent
societies may therefore be forced by military might to conform to liberal ways. A
cosmopolitan conception of toleration is not necessarily interventionist. As I will
try to clarify in the next section, cosmopolitans can be sensitive to the different
reasons why intervention may not be the best or even a morally acceptable way of
enforcing their critical evaluations against decentpeoples. But itwill certainlymean
that liberal peoples, consistent with the demands of justice and equal respect, are
obliged to take a critical stance with regard to decent peoples. It is no more a show
of disrespect for decent peoples to criticize their internally nonliberal arrangements
than it shows lack of respect to criticize associationswithin a liberal state that aspire
to disband the liberal constitution of that state. According to the cosmopolitan con-
ception, a necessary condition formeeting themembership criteria for a just Society
of Peoples is that a society honours not just the basic human rights Rawls identifies
but also the standard liberal rights that liberal states offer their own citizens.
4. IS COSMOPOLITAN TOLERATION INTERVENTIONIST?
An immediately appealing aspect of Rawls’s account of international toleration is
that it rules out intervention by liberal states against decent peoples. Allowing lib-
eral peoples to evaluate critically the domestic arrangements of decent peoples, it
is argued, will pave the way for liberals to attack these otherwise peaceful societies
on the ground that liberal rights, such as democratic participation, equal citizen-
ship of members, and so on, are not being honoured. Even if a liberal should find
objectionable such restrictions of personal liberties, she should take greater moral
offence at the prospect of allowing a country to be invaded by another with the goal
of promoting and defending liberal democratic values. After all, while violations of
basic rights count as a serious violation whose urgency may call for military action
to help put an immediate end to these serious violations, the restriction of liberal
freedoms, unfortunate as it is, does not seem to warrant the high moral cost of any
militaryaction.Theunderstandable fear that thecosmopolitanaccountof toleration
would take us down the path of intervention is one reasonwhy some commentators
might hesitate to endorse the cosmopolitan ideal.
But the cosmopolitan idea of toleration need not ground an interventionist lib-
eral international policy. What the cosmopolitan position does is to establish the
standards forcriticallyevaluating the legitimacyof societies. Itwilldisqualifydecent
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peoples frommembership in good standing of the Society of Peoples. But while cos-
mopolitan toleration does not hold decent peoples to be in good standing, whether
it also necessarily opens theway to intervention is a furthermatter that is subject to
additional moral considerations. This is because the making of a critical judgment
that a state is unjust is a necessary but insufficient condition for intervention. The
act of a military invasion must satisfy further conditions before it can be treated as
justified. These conditions are the familiar ones of the just war theory: right author-
ization, right intent, last resort, reasonable chance of success, and so on. There are
good moral reasons why a permissible intervention has to satisfy a right authoriz-
ation condition; there are good reasons why a permissible intervention has to be
one that can reasonably be believed to be likely to be successful. I don’t assume that
these conditions are definitive or beyond dispute; my point is thatmaking the judg-
ment that a regime is highly illegitimate is not a sufficient warrant for intervening
against it; other conditions must be met before military action, even in the service
of enforcing liberal rights, can be seen as amorally appropriateway of enforcing the
judgment. As mentioned earlier, cosmopolitan toleration is about ‘how to judge’;
how we are to act on that judgment is a further consideration that the principle of
cosmopolitan toleration itself is not meant to settle.
Some commentatorsmight think that affirming cosmopolitan justicemeans also
acceptingtheenforcementofcosmopolitanjustice.This isright, ifenforcementisnot
limited to intervention. Yet some readers might think that my non-interventionist
cosmopolitan position is a toothless one, that the making of a critical judgment
means also accepting the means necessary for imposing that judgment. Fernando
Teso´n might be cited as an example of a cosmopolitan who holds the view that
cosmopolitansmustbeprepared toacton their critical judgmentsagainstnonliberal
regimes.53 But this observation implausibly and mistakenly thinks that a critical
judgment must be enforced without consideration of the costs of the enforcement.
Indeed, Teso´n has recently clarified his position on cosmopolitan intervention,
and he nowwrites that it is not possible ‘to ground the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention solely on the question of the moral legitimacy of the regime, because
there aremany caseswhere the collapse of political legitimacywill not be enough to
justify intervention’.54 The judgmentof themoral illegitimacyof a regimeprovides a
necessary condition for intervening against it – one obviously couldnot permissibly
interveneagainsta legitimateregime.Butwhile illegitimacyisanecessarycondition,
it is also obviously not sufficient for justifying intervention. Additional questions
must be addressed before intervention against an illegitimate regime is morally
permissible: is the moral crisis perpetrated by the illegitimate regime sufficiently
severeandurgent towarrantmilitaryaction inorder toputan immediate end to it? Is
military action the only reasonable option left, after political negotiation and other
non-violent attempts at correcting the situation have been tried and shown to have
53. See F. Teso´n, Humanitarian Intervention (1997); idem, ‘Kantian Theory of International Law’; and
idem, ‘Kantian Theory of International Law’, (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review, 53–102. See also
D. Luban, ‘JustWar and Human Rights’, (1980) 9 (2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 160.
54. F. Teso´n, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane (eds.),
Humanitarian Intervention (2003), 99 (emphasis in original).
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failed? Is there proper authorization of the intervention in order to ensure that the
intervention is not performed by a particular state solely for ulterior self-interested
reasons, but that it is indeed grounded on universal principles? Is military action
going to be productive rather than counter-productive (which it will be if amilitary
invasionostensibly to protect human rights actually results in greater human rights
violations)? Does a particular intervention satisfy the condition of proportionality?
It would hardly be surprising that few forceful impositions and defences of liberal
democratic rights (as opposed to basic human rights that are being systemically
violated) can pass the test of proportionality. I do not intend decisively to address
these questions about just intervention here; I raise them only to stress that the
legitimacy of an intervention hinges on a host of complex questions in addition to
the question of a country’s nonliberal character. Furthermore, it will be a misun-
derstanding to treat these questions as simply pragmatic and political rather than
moral ones. Conditions such as last resort, rightful authority, and proportionality
are not simply matters of strategy but of rightful action.
Thus few cosmopolitans actually claim, implausibly, that nonliberal states are
immediately legitimate targets of intervention. Teso´n in fact affirms this distinction
between judging and enforcing a judgment to be obvious in his analysis, and notes
that his earlier analysis on intervention fails to highlight explicitly this obvious
distinction, thus giving his readers the impression that the illegitimacy of a regime
isbothanecessaryandsufficientconditionforintervention.55 Indeed,cosmopolitans
can be aware that interventions to promote liberalismmaynot be themost effective
strategy and indeedmay be counter-productive. Local resentment and anger against
outsidemilitaryactioncanhelpconcentrate thepowerandauthorityofconservative
illiberal elements in a society, further stymieing efforts at liberal reform.
But the fact that cosmopolitan toleration does not necessitate intervention to
pursue cosmopolitan ends does not mean that cosmopolitan justice is toothless
and unenforceably utopian. It is certainly not presented as idly utopian. There are
different ways in which cosmopolitan values can be promoted and impressed on
others without military intervention. Active critical engagement, political negoti-
ations, and trade incentives (and even disincentives under appropriate conditions)
are obvious non-military alternatives of realizing cosmopolitan ends without re-
sort to force. The active and organized use of what Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’ –
education, intellectual exchanges, cultural dissemination, and so on – to encour-
age nonliberal states to come to appreciate liberal values is another peaceful and
co-operative method of encouraging liberalization in nonliberal societies that cos-
mopolitans can endorse.56 A non-interventionist cosmopolitan position has at its
disposal these and other means for encouraging liberal reforms in decent societies.
Rawls questions the propriety of offering incentives to decent peoples for them to
reform; he also cautions against allowing world bodies such as the United Nations
to take sides against nonliberal regimes, and he objects to the ‘granting of subsidies
55. Ibid., at 98–9, 99 n. 18.
56. J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success inWorld Politics (2004).
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[by liberal peoples] to other peoples as incentives to become more liberal’.57 But
according to the cosmopolitan conception, these kinds of pressures and other forms
of incentives to encourage liberal reforms are acceptable methods of promoting
cosmopolitan values by non-military means. The use of institutional authority and
power need not always be violent and coercive, and global institutional authority
can be understood in this same way.
The cosmopolitan positionwill thus encouragemore open debate and construct-
ive criticism in international fora concerning nonliberal domestic practices and in-
stitutions.Byopendebate Imeanthat liberalpeoplesmustbepreparedalways togive
reasonsandarguments for their criticisms, and to reply ingood faith to the responses
of those criticized. Thus broad-brush and unsupported and ill-informed criticisms
and curt dismissal of responses are ruled out. But this does not mean that liberals
must assume the equal validity of all positions. They are to stand by their commit-
mentsbydefendingandgiving reasons for them.But if thenonliberal constitutionof
decent peoples can be criticized, so also can the illiberal practices of constitutionally
liberal countries be subject to critical discussion. For example, the practice of capi-
tal punishment in the United States should be a legitimate discussion topic at the
United Nations and not be rejected out of court as a meddling in internal affairs.58
The European Union’s policy of conditioning membership on domestic liberal
democratic reforms is another example of non-forcefulmeans of urging and encour-
aging liberalization. This, I take it, does not mean that membership of a world body
such as the United Nations be currently limited only to members in good standing
of the liberal Society of Peoples, since theUnitedNations provides the only viable in-
stitutional setting for discussions and debates between states whether legitimate or
not (and illegitimate statesmust still be spoken to). The Society of Peoples, ifwe like,
refers to a moral membership rather than an actual institutional one. According to
the cosmopolitan view, a world federation of liberal peoples, as envisioned by Kant,
would be the hope.59 Until that hope is realized, however, as long as an ideally just
SocietyofPeoples is still amoralaspiration, theremustbeaplace for internationalor-
ganizations inwhich all societies, liberal or not, can engage one another in peaceful
fashion – the alternativewould bewar. But it is another thing to usemoralmember-
ship of the Society of Peoples as a criterion for other forms of co-operative institu-
tionalmembership. For example, it is reasonable to conditionmembershipof special
trading blocs and other international co-operative organizations on liberal reforms.
One important implication of the cosmopolitan account is that the principle of
state sovereignty, as commonly understood in international law, will have to be
revised. As Rawls notes, the notion of absolute sovereignty – a state having abso-
lute right over how it treats its own citizens – is now obsolete.60 But cosmopolitan
57. Rawls, supra note 1, at 84–5.
58. Recall the attitude of the formerUSSenator JesseHelmswho, as chair of theUSSenateCommittee onForeign
Relations, scornfully dismissed a 1998 UN-commissioned report that was critical of the practice of the death
penalty in the United States as ‘dead on arrival’.
59. The European Union, with its liberal democratic requirements for membership, is thus a good indication of
what such aworld federation based on themoralmembership of a Society of Liberal Peoplesmight look like.
60. Rawls, supra note 1, at 25–7.
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toleration will entail further revision of the idea of sovereignty – it will hold sov-
ereignty conditional on states meeting the standards of liberal justice.61 The es-
tablishment of an international criminal court to try violations of rights within a
country’s own boundaries will be one consequence of a cosmopolitan limitation on
sovereignty.
Holding sovereignty conditional onhowstates respect the liberty of their citizens
may appear very troublesome to some. But this concern is allayed if, again, we are
clear that failing tomeet conditions for sovereignty does notmean that a state loses
all standing and can be attacked. The lack of sovereignty onlymeans primarily that
the legitimate authority of the state can be morally questioned (whether it should
be intervened against or not is a separate point), that other peoples are not bound to
treat it as the proper voice of its people just because it enjoys de facto authority. For
example, as Pogge suggests, according to the revised view of sovereignty the right of
an authoritarian regime to borrow capital from globalmarkets or its right to sell the
country’s resources, currently seen as any de facto government’s entitlement, need
not be recognized.62
Critics might worry that tying state legitimacy to liberal democratic standards
overly narrows the definition of legitimacy. Surely, the concern is expressed, legit-
imacy cannot be limited to liberal democratic states. But, in reply, if legitimacy is a
central issue, it would seem thatmeeting some basic liberal democratic standards of
justice has to be a necessary condition for state legitimacy. As Allen Buchanan puts
it, ‘democratic theory provides an account of the conditions under which citizens
can have an obligation to one another to take compliancewith the laws seriously’.63
Legitimacy is grounded on the state’s recognition of the equality of each of its cit-
izens, and a nonliberal state’s failure to treat each one of its citizens as equals offends
against this minimal condition for legitimacy.
Even if a critical evaluation of decent peoples does not necessarily justify inter-
veningagainst them,criticsof thecosmopolitanconceptionmight still beconcerned
that it puts us on a slippery slope towards intervention. But this concern is too hasty
if we can imagine the establishing of appropriate institutional safeguards within
a cosmopolitan framework. An example of such a safeguard is the requirement of
multilateral authorization for any intervention. One might say that this safeguard
can easily be abused or ignored, but this abuse or ignoring of the requirement is not
made easier because of the cosmopolitan position but in spite of it. (The question
is whether there can be safeguards in place to help to ensure that the adoption of a
principle does not itself make its abuse likely, not whether there can be safeguards
against immoral actions in general). Indeed, Rawls’s own account of the limits of
permissible war in Part III of The Law of Peoples is sensible and can be endorsed
by cosmopolitans consistently with the cosmopolitan account of toleration. Again,
judging a regime to be illegitimate is still many steps away from the conclusion
61. For one discussion of reforming our understanding of sovereignty under a cosmopolitan framework,
see T. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitism and Sovereignty’, in idem,World Poverty and Human Rights (2002).
62. Ibid., ch. 6.
63. Buchanan, supra note 22, at 253.
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that the regimemaybe attacked. Cosmopolitan tolerationprovides a benchmark for
legitimacy, but some account of just war (which a complete cosmopolitan theory
must offer) is needed to provide the bridging premises towards the conclusion that
intervention is required.
Given that most cosmopolitans would sensibly accept that intervention to pro-
mote andprotect liberal freedomsand rightsmustmeet strict standards andhence is
rarely justified in practice, theremay be little practical difference between Rawlsian
toleration and cosmopolitan toleration with respect to the issue of intervention.
But, as suggested, other importantpractical differences remain.Unlike international
Rawlsians, cosmopolitanswill allow for othermeans of encouraging liberal reforms
within decent societies; they can criticize the organization of decent societies for
failing tomeet standards of international justice.64 This critical evaluationwith the
aim of transforming nonliberal societies into more liberal ones is ruled out by the
Rawlsianmodel.
So while it is true that under real-world conditions liberal peoples may have to
accommodate decent peoples, it is another thing to say that they should not aspire
to transform them ‘in a liberal direction’, as Thomas Nagel notes.65 According to a
liberal conception of toleration, the accommodation of decent peoples should be
seen as part of non-ideal theory rather than as a principle of toleration within ideal
theory, contra Rawls. It is important to see that this distinction between ideal and
non-ideal theory is not a substantively vacuous one. Ideal theory, as Rawls himself
writes, ‘presents a conception of a just society that we are to achieve if we can’;
that is, its principles set the goals that we are to strive for.66 Even if these goals
are not attainable for the moment because of real-world constraints, ideal theory
nonetheless identifies for us the direction in which to go. To treat the toleration
of decent peoples as part of ideal theory means that our conception of a fully just
global order is compatible with the presence of certain nonliberal societies and that
there are moral reasons against wanting to take them in a more liberal direction.67
In treating the accommodation of decent peoples as amatter of non-ideal theory, on
the other hand,wehave a different vision.Wewill hold that, even thoughwe cannot
get there now, a fully just global order will be one consisting of liberal states. It is
this higher vision that the cosmopolitan conceptionof toleration aspires to, and this
higher standardwill influence the foreignpolicyof liberal peoples. It does, therefore,
make a substantive normative difference whether we treat the accommodation of
decent peoples as necessitated by non-ideal conditions or whether their tolerance is
required as a matter of justice within ideal theory.
64. There is, of course, the administrative and legal question of who is to decide whether a society has met
the standards of justice. But there are already international bodies in place administering the demands of
international justice and law. TheUNHigh Commission onHuman Rights and the UN Security Council, for
example, currently play this role. As always, hard questions of judgment are involved, and the question of
how to reform and design better institutional decision-making procedures is continually to be confronted.
But thecosmopolitanproposal doesnotper se require special orunachievablemodesof administering justice
compared with the Rawlsian approach. It just establishes different guiding principles. A suitably reformed
United Nations operating on different principles can serve as the authority making such judgments.
65. T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, (2005) 33 (2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 113, at 135.
66. Rawls, supra note 7, at 246.
67. Nagel, supra note 65, at 135.
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The fear that the cosmopolitan account of tolerationwill lead to excessive liberal
intervention seems tome, then, to be fuelled by the failure to distinguish the ideal of
toleration from the practice of intervention. The idea of toleration, disengaged from
the question of intervention, will eliminate the burden of limiting the occasions
of war from that ideal, and will thus remove the overly cautionary stance that
constrains Rawls’s understanding of international toleration. Ifwe see international
tolerationasan idealdesignednot todemarcate the limitsof interventionas suchbut
rather to define the limits of proper judgment,wewill feel less pressured to conceive
toleration generously in the way in which Rawls does for fear of otherwise opening
thefloodgates to intervention.Wecanconfidently advanceamore stringent account
of international toleration if we are also able to work out, within the cosmopolitan
framework, a clear set of strict conditions for when the military enforcement of
cosmopolitan rightmay takeplace.68 Cosmopolitan toleration sets higher standards
at which all peoples should aim, but it is compatible with that aspiration towant to
realize these standards peacefully.
5. IS COSMOPOLITAN TOLERATION IMPERIALISTIC?
A common perception of the cosmopolitan position that I am defending is that
even if it is not interventionist, its universalist moral aspiration amounts to a form
of moral imperialism.69 It, after all, treats liberalism to be the appropriate moral
benchmark for all societies. Note, however, that this ‘realist’ concern applies also to
Rawls’s Lawof Peoples, for Rawls’s project also offers universal principles to regulate
therelationsbetweenpeoples.But it is truethat themorerobustmoralcommitments
of the cosmopolitan position I am defending makes it apparently more vulnerable
to the realist challenge. That is, the realist challenge against liberal universalism
applies a fortiori to the cosmopolitan alternative to Rawls. So letme close with some
pre-emptive remarks to temper this concern.
First, if the concern is that cosmopolitism is imperialistic because of its univer-
salizing tendency, the responsewill be that there is nothing imperialist per se about
universalist aspirations. What is of concern is the universal imposition of views or
principles onpeoples that they can reasonably reject. But the cosmopolitan position
is based on arguments and is presented to others not by appeal to their fear (of
68. My remarks draw on Beitz’s point that once we recognize the role of human rights to be that of setting the
moral limits of sovereignty and not that of setting the limits of permissible intervention, we may be more
prepared to defend universally a more robust account of rights than does Rawls. If human rights are seen
narrowly as the standards bywhich the limits of non-intervention are breached, then formany good reasons
we would want to err on the side of caution and bemodest in our proposal of universally defensible human
rights. The world is vulnerable to excessive intervention as it is, and we do not want to render it even more
vulnerable by setting more stringent standards for states to meet if they wish to escape intervention from
zealous defenders of human rights. But if the role of human rights is seen to be more general than that of
determining the legitimacy of states, that still leaves open the issue of the appropriate enforcing and defence
of these rights, and we can advance a more exacting list of rights without fear that we are also lowering the
bar for going to war. C. Beitz, ‘Human Rights as a Common Concern’, (2001) 95 (2) American Philosophical
Review 269.
69. The discussion in this section is prompted by questions raised at the Leiden symposium and comments by
the editors of the journal.
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extinction if they reject our proposal) but by appeal to their reason. Indeed, central
to the cosmopolitan ideal is the concept of reasons that others can share, and this
straightaway means that cosmopolitans have to be prepared to listen to the argu-
ments of others and revise their own policy commitments when there are good
reasons for doing so. Thus the cosmopolitan idea that I am defending can embrace
what Martti Koskenniemi calls a ‘culture of formalism’. It seeks to avoid ‘imperial-
ism while at the same time continuing the search for something beyond particular
interests and identity politics, or the irreducibility of difference’.70 Koskenniemi
rightlywarns against smugly presuming that standards of justice applicable to one’s
own society must also be applicable to all others.71 But the cosmopolitism account
of toleration I am defending does not entail such a smugness and complacency. The
standards of justice applicable to liberal peoples are applicable to other peoples not
simplybecause theyhappened tobe affirmedby liberal peopleswhohave themeans
to promote their ideals, but because these are principles grounded on reasons that
others can come to share.
The cosmopolitan view that I amproposing is grounded on liberal principles. But
there should beno inherent concern that thiswillmean the imposition of a doctrine
whose totality is beyond dispute and criticism. Liberalism is not a ‘dead dogma’, to
use Mill’s phrase and, to prevent it from becoming so, its active engagement with
other doctrines is helpful. Unlike their smug and overbearing colonial predecessors,
contemporary liberals today must adopt a more self-critical and tentative attitude.
They should be ready to see flaws in their own views in the light of what others can
tell them and of what their own values commit them to, and be prepared to admit
mistakes and be ready to revise their commitments in the light of new arguments or
facts. Liberals dohaveplenty to learn fromother viewpoints, and theyhave in recent
times benefited enormously from heeding their critics. It was the communitarian
challenge that provoked liberals to restore the community to its rightful place in
their discourse. In the latter half of this century, the socialist objection inspired an
egalitarian interpretation of liberalism. Feminist critiques too have moved liberals
to examine certain issues long overlooked, such as justice within the family and the
question of free speech with regard to pornography and hate-speech. In the inter-
national arena, theemphasisplacedby someso-called ‘communitarian’ countrieson
individual responsibility, a pointmany liberal practitioners tend tomiss in their zeal
to protect individual rights, has likewise reminded liberal states of their practical
failings with respect to cultivating responsible citizenship.72 None of these lessons
compelled an abandonment of liberalism in its entirety; but they set in motion
70. Koskenniemi, supra note 16, at 500.
71. Ibid., at 493, also 499.
72. Some (primarily nonliberal) countries have proposed a ‘Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’
as a counter-balance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While I do not think that the idea of
individual responsibility is fundamentally philosophically different from the idea of rights but is indeed the
flip-side of the same idea (to be coherent, individual rights must presuppose corresponding responsibilities
on the part of other individuals, and to be consistent one who accepts that she has rights must also accept
responsibilitiesonherpart), thecoming into forceof adeclarationofhumanresponsibilitieswillnonetheless
counteract the general emphasis in liberal practice on rights to the detriment of duties and responsibilities
(without which rights cannot be claimed).
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important revisions or debates within liberal thought and practice, revisions and
debates which have helped to strengthen the liberal position by making it more
alive to new agendas and challenges. A healthy dose of trepidation and awareness
of fallibility when advancing our ideas, rather than rendering them impotent and
insecure, invigorates and renews them.73
In short, universalism is in itself not a concern;what is of concern is universalism
without reason, and this latter does not apply to the cosmopolitan position properly
understood.Criticsofcosmopolitismwillhavetoshowhowcosmopolitanprinciples
are subjective and based on narrow interests in the way in which they believe. I
have not, of course, demonstrated here beyond dispute that that cosmopolitism is
grounded on reasons that all can share; mymore modest claim is that it should not
be concluded out of court that cosmopolitism is a subjective viewpoint that is not
grounded on universalizable reasons.
Further, the perception might be motivated by the moral failures of liberal cos-
mopolitism when it has been put into practice historically. Critics often point to
colonialism and to modern-day neo-imperialism to highlight the dangers of moral
universalism and as evidence of how cosmopolitan principles (or some universalist
principles much like them) provide convenient disguises for self-interested ends.
Koskenniemi’s discussion of the 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic
in the name of universal principles provides an example of such an abuse.74 But
this line of criticismmistakes any projectwith a global ambition for a cosmopolitan
one. Empire-building is a globalizing project that is not grounded on principles and
reasons all peoples can share. Cosmopolitism has a universalist aspiration, but not
all policies that have universalist aspirations are based on cosmopolitan principles.
The Dominican Republic intervention may be rationalized as an intervention to
protect freedom, but the question is whether it can indeed be shown to be so. Cos-
mopolitans can accept Koskenniemi’s reasons why that intervention was morally
unjustified. That intervention was morally flawed precisely because it could not
be justified by universal principles, not because it was required by universal prin-
ciples. The fault, in short, was because universal principleswere not taken seriously
enough. And while it is certainly correct that abstract humanitarian principles can
be, and historically have been, invoked to justify self-interested interventions and
foreign policies, the fact that principles can be misappropriated for particular and
narrow ends does not invalidate these principles. If this were so, there would be
few moral principles left in any domain. That the principle of free speech can be
misused does not alone compel the denial of that principle.75 That just-war prin-
ciples can be falsely invoked to justify aggressive war does notmean that we should
not bother with clarifying the moral conditions for a just war – on the contrary,
it means that we need all the more a clear set of conditions to provide us with
a standard against which to judge such wars. To put my point concisely, there is
73. For more discussion on the failure of liberal universalism in practice see Tan, supra note 3, ch. 8.
74. Koskenniemi, supra note 16, at 480 et seq.
75. I discuss this point in ‘The Unavoidability of Morality’, in T. Nardin and M. Williams (eds.), Humanitarian
Intervention (forthcoming 2005).
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nothing astonishing about the observation that cosmopolitan principles can be and
have been abused for self-aggrandizing ends, or that they can be wrongly enforced
even if with good intention.What is astonishing is the critics’ conclusion that these
principles are therefore suspect, when the fault lies with actors who abuse prin-
ciples. To be sure, even well-meaning attempts to enforce cosmopolitan principles
can have morally drastic results.76 But this only means that more care and good
judgment is needed to apply these principles, not that these principles should be
abandoned.
The real concern, then, is not whether cosmopolitan principles can be misused
or abused for non-cosmopolitan ends; any moral principle can be misappropriated.
It is never a necessary condition for the validity of a principle that it cannot be
abused. The real question iswhether cosmopolitismnecessarily leads to the forcible
imposition of worldviews on others that they can reasonably reject. And I would
argue that it does neither of these.
The cosmopolitan conception is not grounded on an imperialistic ambition, but
is fundamentally motivated by the recognition that there are individuals whose
liberal rights are being systemically denied by their own states. Cosmopolitans are
notmotivated by the assumption that they knowbest howall societies are to be run;
rather they are moved by the oppression of individuals whose freedoms are being
denied by their own state. Cosmopolitan principles serve to defend the defenceless,
not to impose a conception of the good society on all peoples. It cannot be an
argument against cosmopolitan justice that it has a universalistic moral agenda –
for this is precisely and explicitly its point. The issue is whether that agenda is
grounded on reasons that all reasonable peoples should accept.
76. David Kennedy draws attention to the dangers, what he calls ‘the dark sides’, of enforcing abstract humani-
tarianprinciples inD.Kennedy,TheDarkSides ofVirtue (2005). ButKennedy’swarning thatagents takeheedof
the implications of intervention (‘the pragmatism of consequences’, as he calls it) andmaintain ‘a clear-eyed
focus on the purpose of our work’ (‘the pragmatism of intent’) against a blind and impulsive enforcement
of humanitarian principles is a point cosmopolitans can surely agree with (ibid., at xx). As I suggest above,
there are moral reasons why cosmopolitans will refrain from intervention just because a state is deemed
intolerably unjust. That a given intervention will make matters worse is, of course, one important moral
consideration against it. Kennedy’swarning of the dark side of humanitarian enforcement is not a complaint
against universal humanitarian principles, but an exhortation that salient competingmoral considerations
not be overlooked by humanitarian agents (ibid., ch. 9).
